Copyright 2008 by Northwestern University School of Law
Northwestern University Law Review Colloquy

Vol. 103

HONOR‘S CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT: THE OATH
AND PRESIDENTIAL TRANSITIONS
Paul Horwitz

*

INTRODUCTION
Ever since Bruce Ackerman introduced us to the phrase, constitutional
lawyers have come to think of ―constitutional moments‖ as momentous and
irregular.1 They are assumed to be extraordinary occasions on which the
nation rethinks its constitutional commitments and, in effect, rewrites them
outside the formal constitutional amendment process. In two centuries of
constitutional history, Ackerman identifies only three such constitutional
moments, including the Founding itself.2 The rest of the time, constitutional government exists in the realm of ordinary politics.3
I want to suggest another approach. Constitutional moments are momentous, but they are not irregular. To the contrary, they are routine. In
particular, the changeover of executive power that we are undergoing right
now bears witness to a simple proposition: every presidential transition is a
constitutional moment.
American politics routinely treats the peaceful transition of executive
power as evidence of the Republic‘s continuity and stability. But each presidential transition is also a moment in which at least one branch of the federal government must consider anew what the Constitution means and what
it demands, and ratify or rescind the constitutional readings that have come
before. Every such succession embodies the tension inherent in constitutional moments—the tension between consistency and change.

*

Associate Professor, University of Alabama School of Law. I am grateful to Jason Mazzone and
Sai Prakash for comments.
1
See generally 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991); 2 BRUCE
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) (setting out his theory of ―constitutional moments‖ in American history).
2
See, e.g., Steven G . Calabresi, The President, The Supreme Court, and the Founding Fathers: A
Reply to Professor Ackerman, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 469, 471 (2006) (noting Ackerman‘s claim that ―the
United States has had three and only three constitutional regimes or constitutional moments‖). The other two constitutional moments identified by Ackerman are the Civil War and Reconstruction, and the
New Deal.
3
See, e.g., 2 ACKERMAN, supra note 1, at 4–8 (distinguishing between ―normal politics‖ and politics in times of crisis).
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This Essay argues that the constitutional moment represented by the
presidential transition is instantiated in a single act: the taking of the presidential oath. That oath is both an official action and a deeply personal one,
and the combination is significant. It suggests the intimate connection between the official duties assigned to the President by Article II of the Constitution and the personal honor of the President. By committing himself to
preserve the Constitution and fulfill his Article II duties, the President ties
his own honor to a particular understanding of the Constitution.4 That understanding is indefeasible: he cannot simply defer to the understanding of
the courts, of Congress, of prior presidents, or even of the people. In taking
the Constitution‘s measure, the President is ultimately on his own.
We have come to think of honor as a largely obsolete virtue.5 But it
has not yet vanished, and its importance crests in the moment of the taking
of the presidential oath, as virtually every individual to take the oath has
recognized. As Barack Obama prepares to take his own oath as the 44th
President of the United States, it is worth considering what that oath means
and what implications it has for his presidency.
Part I of this Essay discusses the nature and history of the presidential
oath. Part II asks whether the oath‘s obligations are prospective or retrospective. Part III argues that although other constitutional players‘ understanding of the Constitution may influence the President, his obligation to
interpret the document for himself is indefeasible. Part IV offers some advice to President-elect Obama as putative oath-taker.
One note of caution is necessary. Some readers of this Essay have
warned against relying too strongly on Ackerman‘s constitutional moment
idea, or have argued that presidential oath-taking does not represent a constitutional moment because Ackermanian constitutional moments are genuinely transformative of constitutional meaning, while a president vows
specifically to ―preserve‖ the Constitution.6 While the contributions of this
Essay do not depend on how closely presidential transitions resemble Ackermanian constitutional moments, it is true that are important distinctions
between the two.
But it is worth thinking about presidential transitions in those terms because it is important to consider what those transitions say about constitutional change as well as stability. Through the oath, presidential transitions
require each new president to rethink constitutional meaning for himself.
The implications of that obligation can be far-reaching. Such moments may
not be as rare as the ones described by Ackerman, but they are all the more
remarkable because conscientious oath-takers like the President are required
to reimagine the Constitution at such regular intervals. If we can capture a
4

I use the masculine throughout this Essay for convenience only.
For a classic discussion, see Peter Berger, On the Obsolescence of the Concept of Honour, 11 EUR.
J. SOC. 39 (1970), reprinted in LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 149 (Michael J. Sandel ed., 1984).
6
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
5
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sense of the implications of this obligation and of the weight and solemnity
of the oath, we may come to see just how momentous these transitions truly
are.
I.

THE OATH AS CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT

A. Reading the Presidential Oath Clause
The President is not the only officeholder to take a constitutional oath.
Under Article VI of the Constitution, every federal and state officer takes an
oath or affirmation to ―support this Constitution.‖7 The language of the
federal statute implementing this command requires officeholders to swear
or affirm to ―support and defend the Constitution of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic.‖8
But only the presidential oath is set out in specific terms in the constitutional text itself. ―Before he enters on the Execution of his Office,‖ the
President shall swear or affirm the following: ―I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United
States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States.‖9
Two aspects of this oath are worth noting. The first is its unique status:
the Framers considered it necessary to offer specific language in the Constitution itself for no other constitutional officer. The second is its distinct
language. Other officeholders promise to ―support and defend the Constitution of the United States‖; only the President is sworn to ―preserve, protect
and defend‖ it.10
Whether these subtle distinctions matter has been a subject of some
debate. One debate is between those who see the Presidential Oath Clause
as containing a general authority to act, extraconstitutionally if necessary, to
preserve the nation, and those who believe that the Constitution confers no
such authority on the President.
According to the first view, the Constitution should be read as containing a ―meta-rule of construction‖ requiring ―national self-preservation‖—a
rule that ―may even, in cases of extraordinary necessity, trump specific constitutional requirements.‖11 The responsibility for judging whether and how
7

U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 3.
5 U.S.C. § 3331 (2006).
9
U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.
10
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitution of Necessity, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1257, 1261
(2004) (―Even more clearly so than with the universal oath requirement [of] Article VI of the Constitution . . . , the Presidential Oath Clause cannot be reduced to a general political loyalty requirement.‖).
11
Id. at 1257 (emphasis added); see also Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993) (arguing on different grounds that the President has a ―general authority to protect and defend the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States from
harm.‖).
8
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the meta-rule applies is vested most directly in the President, by virtue of
his ―special sworn duty‖ to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution.12
Michael Stokes Paulsen roots this meta-rule in the ―awesome and personal‖
duty created by the Presidential Oath Clause to protect, preserve, and defend ―the nation whose Constitution it is . . . by every indispensable means
within his power.‖13 This view finds its most pithy expression in Justice
Jackson‘s classic observation that the Constitution is not a ―suicide pact.‖14
Others argue that although ―the Constitution creates a powerful chief
executive, it does not empower the President to suspend the Constitution in
order to save it.‖15 According to this view, Paulsen errs by ―too quickly and
too easily equat[ing] preserving the Constitution with preserving the nation.‖16 Against Paulsen‘s ―suicide pact‖ argument, they argue that ―a system that values self-preservation at all costs is a suicide of another sort, for
the system sacrifices all other ideals on the false altar of survival.‖17
A closely related issue is the meaning of the Presidential Oath Clause
itself. Does the Clause confer power on the President, or does it define and
constrain the exercise of power granted to the President elsewhere in the
Constitution? Although he denies that the Presidential Oath Clause is a
freestanding grant of executive power, Paulsen argues that the Clause incorporates and reinforces ―the power to preserve, protect, and defend the
nation and its constitutional order that inheres in the traditional understanding of the ‗executive Power‘ of a nation.‖18 By contrast, Sai Prakash asserts
that the Clause ―does not grant power,‖ but rather ―creates a duty‖ to obey
the Constitution.19
We need not resolve these debates here. What is important is that a
careful reading of the Presidential Oath Clause carries with it significant
implications for the President‘s role, duties, and powers under the Constitution. Unless he treats the oath as a mere formality, the President cannot
shrink from grappling with the meaning of the Presidential Oath Clause.
B. Honor and the Oath
From the first presidential oath-taking to the present day, our chief executives have recognized that the presidential oath is intimately connected
to the nature of their duties in office, and thus that it serves as a public

12

Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1258.
Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1261, 1263.
14
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
15
Saikrishna Prakash, The Constitution as Suicide Pact, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1299, 1300
(2004) [hereinafter Prakrash, Constitution as Suicide Pact].
16
Thomas P. Crocker, Overcoming Necessity: Torture and the State of Constitutional Culture, 61
SMU L. REV. 221, 244 (2008).
17
Prakash, Constitution as Suicide Pact, supra note 15, at 1320.
18
Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1263 n.14.
19
Prakash, Constitution as Suicide Pact, supra note 15, at 1301.
13
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pledge to stand accountable for the actions they commit in the name of the
Constitution.
This connection would have been obvious to the founding generation.
In that era, the oath tied the performance of public office closely to ―human
honor and obligation.‖20 Honor was all the more important in a new nation
―lacking an established aristocracy,‖ in which the display of public virtue
and trustworthiness was one of the few ―proving ground[s]‖ available, ―a
source of stability in [a] contested political [and social] landscape.‖21 Honor
was not simply a private virtue; to the contrary, it depended on its public
nature. ―[A] man of honor was defined by the respect that he received in
public.‖22 The Presidential Oath thus tied the President‘s personal honor to
the conscientious performance of his duties—linking him, in Alexander
Hamilton‘s words, to ―the restraints of public opinion‖ and ―the jealousy
and watchfulness of the people.‖23
The connection between the Presidential Oath and the President‘s own
conception of his duties, and the threat of dishonor as a mechanism for ensuring the President‘s fealty to that oath, has been recognized in presidential
inaugural addresses throughout our history.24 George Washington, for example, in his second inaugural address, emphasized the public nature of his
oath, and pledged, if he fell short in his duties, to be ―subject to the upbraidings of all who are now witnesses of the present solemn ceremony.‖25 Martin Van Buren noted ―the presence of my assembled countrymen‖ as he
prepared ―to make the solemn promise that yet remains, and to pledge myself that I will faithfully execute the office I am about to fill.‖26 Benjamin
Harrison noted that although there was ―no constitutional or legal requirement that the President shall take the oath of office in the presence of the
people,‖ to do so was ―manifest[ly] appropriate[],‖ because it rendered the
oath ―a mutual covenant‖ between the President and the citizenry.27 In the
twentieth century, William Howard Taft noted that any presidential oathtaker who does not ―feel a heavy weight of responsibility‖ either ―has no
conception of the powers and duties of the office upon which he is about to
enter, or he is lacking in a proper sense of the obligation which the oath imposes.‖28

20

Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1263 n.13.
JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC xv
(2001).
22
Id. at xvi.
23
The Federalist No. 70, at 477–79 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
24
See Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, the American National Interest and a Call for
Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1, 7–33 (2004).
25
Id. at 9.
26
Id. at 13.
27
Id. at 20–21.
28
Id. at 22.
21
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In short, the Presidential Oath Clause is a deeply—and, in the Ackermanian sense, literally—momentous text. The act of oath-taking ties the
President‘s own honor to his satisfaction of the oath. The act is pregnant
with meaning precisely because taking an oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution calls on the oath-taker to consider what that oath
means—and, in turn, what the Constitution means. Each presidential oathtaker must decide for himself whether the oath calls on the President to preserve the nation at all costs, or whether it calls for the President to hold the
Constitution itself above all else. Thus, each president, every four years,
becomes the sole participant in a constitutional convention of one.
II. THE OATH AS PROSPECTIVE OR RETROSPECTIVE
What are the implications of the Presidential Oath Clause? What does
it mean for the new President—for this new President, and the men and
women who will come after him?
One possibility is that the President can treat his oath as beginning with
his actions as President—and only his actions as President. He must give
some measure of repose to any actions by prior oath-takers whose views
about the scope of the Constitution might differ from his own. In short, the
President could treat his oath-bound obligations as prospective, not retrospective.
This approach acknowledges that each President faces his own constitutional moment and his own interpretation of the Constitution‘s commands. It recognizes that the new President‘s obligations under the oath
commence only once he has actually taken it. Until then, the duty of the
oath attaches only to the current officeholder.29 Such an approach might
ease the inevitable tensions between outgoing and incoming administrations,30 tensions that would be exacerbated if each new President were
viewed as sitting in judgment on the previous administration‘s actions—a
threat that, taken to its extremes, might lead to a flurry of pardons and other
preemptive actions by the outgoing administration.
It is not clear, however, that such an approach is realistic, let alone true
to the oath. The effects of a president‘s actions do not cease when he leaves
office. Most agency regulations and policies, executive orders, and other
administrative actions have continuing force unless and until they are revisited.
Moreover, the President‘s legal obligations hardly arise solely by virtue of law generated within the Executive Branch. To the contrary, the
President‘s foremost duty is to ―take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex29

Cf. Jack M. Beermann & William P. Marshall, The Constitutional Law of Presidential Transitions, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1271–73 (2006) (discussing the Term Clauses of Article II); see also id. at
1285 (noting that a sitting President ―enjoys an electoral mandate for the full four-year period‖ of his
term).
30
See id. at 1263–69 (discussing tensions that arise during presidential transitions).
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ecuted,‖31 which includes the continuing obligation to execute the laws
enacted by Congress. The Executive Branch may also be subject to ongoing orders of the Judicial Branch. Thus, no new President is completely
free to set the constitutional clock to zero upon taking the oath. Indeed, the
presidential oath itself suggests as much: the duty to ―preserve‖ the Constitution implies that the President must engage in a retrospective examination
of at least some prior executive actions.32
If so, then the President might in fact be obliged to revisit everything.
He might view the oath-taking as requiring him to examine every continuing legal obligation involving the Executive Branch. In each instance, the
new President would have to determine whether those obligations were
consistent with his own view of the Constitution, and whether any conflicting views about the constitutionality of those obligations required the Executive Branch to refuse to enforce those legal commands. In extreme
cases, the new President would have to decide whether to undertake enforcement actions against those members of prior administrations whose actions, in the view of the new administration, violated the Constitution or
laws of the United States.
Putting the matter this starkly suggests two things. First, in practice,
opening the books of the prior administration and evaluating every current
legal obligation of the new one is unlikely to require wholesale reversal of
what has come before. Most laws and actions of prior administrations are
simply routine and unexceptional. Still, the fact that every law and legal
obligation pressing upon the Executive Branch would, on this view, be up
for ratification or rejection suggests something of the awesome implications
of the Presidential Oath Clause.
Second, this approach presents practical difficulties of its own. Those
difficulties are as much constitutional as political. Politically, such an approach would expend significant resources and risk serious political tension, thus threatening to derail an administration‘s plans for its crucial first
months in office. Beyond these political concerns, though, presidential
transitions are about stability as well as change. Although the Presidential
Oath Clause, properly understood, might obligate the new President to reconsider the constitutional soundness of the legal order, too radical a redrawing of constitutional lines might damage the symbolic and practical
role played by presidential transitions in emphasizing the continuity of our
constitutional order.

31

U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
Cf. Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96
GEO. L.J. 1613, 1632 (2008) [hereinafter Prakash, Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws] (arguing
that the President‘s oath ―bars [him] from violating the Constitution himself or aiding and abetting the
violations of others, for when he takes either measure, he is not preserving, protecting, and defending the
Constitution‖).
32
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Which choice the new President ought to make—leave the existing
landscape undisturbed or treat the oath as obliging him to revisit the whole
legal order—is a matter for continuing discussion. It is sufficient for now
to note again that however much they may attempt to steer a middle path,
incoming presidents must make some decision about how to proceed. In
that sense, too, each transition is a genuine constitutional moment.
The transition we find ourselves in this time surely heightens our sense
of the occasion‘s momentousness. Justly or not, President Bush has been
accused of repeatedly exceeding his constitutional authority in the name of
national security.33 This transition thus places in relief the contrasts we
have seen in discussing the Presidential Oath Clause. Correctly read, does
the Clause stress the President‘s inherent authority to preserve the nation at
the expense of the Constitution‘s strict commands, or does it stress fidelity
to the Constitution itself? Is the Clause an assignment of power, or a reminder of the President‘s duties under a Constitution that cabins his authority? Should President Obama leave the current administration‘s actions
alone, or should he reexamine and rescind many of those actions, and even
pursue investigations and prosecutions where appropriate?34 If he is a conscientious oath-taker, President Obama must confront all of these questions,
and thus put his own stamp on the Constitution.
III. THE INDEFEASIBILITY OF THE OATH
In facing these questions, the presidential oath-taker cannot pass the
buck. If the President‘s duty as an oath-taker is personal, then his obligation to consider the scope and meaning of his constitutional authority—
whatever the precise contours of that obligation may be—is indefeasible.35
The President may take advice on these questions—from Congress, from
his cabinet officers,36 and from others inside and outside his administration—but he remains the sole ―decider.‖37

33

See, e.g., Michael P. Allen, George W. Bush and the Nature of Executive Authority, 72 BROOK. L.
REV. 871 (2007).
34
See, e.g., James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Early Test for Obama on Domestic Spying Views, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 17, 2008, at A17 (noting that the Obama administration will face a number of early decisions about whether to ratify decisions made by the Bush administration with respect to domestic surveillance, whether to ―disclose publicly more information about how the program was run,‖ and
―whether to work with the Democratic-controlled Congress to investigate the Bush administration officials who approved and ran the wiretapping program‖) (link).
35
Cf. Paulsen, supra note 10, at 1261 (―[T]he President has an independent, personal, and nonabdicable constitutional responsibility of faithful constitutional interpretation and execution.‖) (emphasis
added).
36
See U.S. CONST., art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (empowering the President to require opinions from his heads
of department).
37
See Ed Henry & Barbara Starr, Bush: “I’m the Decider” on Rumsfeld, CNN.com, Apr. 18, 2006,
available at http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/04/18/rumsfeld (recounting President Bush‘s description of himself as the ―decider‖) (link).
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To be sure, in deciding what the Constitution means and what obligations the Constitution and his oath impose on him, the President will certainly be influenced by a variety of factors apart from his own views. We
might divide these into two categories: informational influences and policy
constraints.
Informational influences on the President‘s views on the Constitution
and the oath are likely to come from a variety of sources inside and outside
the Executive Branch. First, Congress itself will have spoken on a number
of constitutional questions—both informally and in the formal sense that a
law‘s passage by Congress implies that Congress believes the legislation is
constitutional. A new president wondering whether he can enforce an existing act of Congress might wish to defer to Congress‘s judgment that the act
is constitutional. But the duty to decide whether that legislation is constitutional ultimately rests with the President.38
Similarly, the President may consider himself bound to defer to any
clearly stated views of the Judicial Branch on questions touching on presidential power. He may do so because he considers those rulings binding in
particular cases, or out of deference to the federal courts as epistemic authorities, or because he believes that abiding by the courts‘ constitutional
decisions is itself an implied requirement of the Constitution he has sworn
to preserve. How far the President‘s obligations to the courts run and
whether he is ultimately free to ignore them where they conflict with his
own constitutional judgments are questions that have roiled constitutional
scholarship in the past few years.39 But the decision to defer is still a decision.40 Again, then, the presidential oath-taker may listen to others—even
coordinate branches—but cannot simply slough off his obligation to decide
for himself what the Constitution means.
A more interesting informational influence comes from the actions of
previous administrations. In considering what his oath requires, the new
president may listen closely to what former administrations have said, either
through their actions or through statements by the Office of Legal Counsel
and other sources of executive opinion. Let us call this ―presidential
precedent.‖ A new president might decide to adhere to the decisions of
previous administrations just as the Supreme Court adheres to its prior decisions.41 Like the principle of stare decisis in the Supreme Court, however,
38

See generally Prakash, Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 32.
See, e.g., Keith Gary Lawson & Christopher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional
Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch:
Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217 (1994); Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Most
Competent Branches: A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 GEO. L.J. 347 (1994); see also LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 254–67 (3d ed. 2000) (discussing the challenges associated
with competing constitutional interpretations among the three branches of government).
40
See Paul Horwitz, Three Faces of Deference, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2008).
41
See Prakash, Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 32, at 1634 n.74 (―Whenever
presidential administrations confront legal questions previously addressed by their predecessors, there is
39
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presidential precedent cannot be absolute. The President takes an oath to
the Constitution, not to his predecessors‘ vision of the Constitution; he may
consider their views, but cannot treat them as binding. Indeed, that is precisely the point of the oath: it is personal. Each new president must ultimately decide what the Constitution requires of him.
A final source of information is the people. In contemplating his oath
and its implications, the President might listen to those who elected him. At
transition times, we often ask whether the President has a ―mandate‖ for
particular changes, or we treat the election as a referendum on the outgoing
President‘s policies, including those decisions that have constitutional overtones. This language is understandable, but it is also incomplete. The oath
may tie the President‘s fortunes to the people who stand witness to his
pledge, but it remains a personal pledge. The question is not whether the
new President will gratify the wishes of the people, but whether he will
honor the promise that he made to them: to preserve the Constitution as he
understands it. Thus, the oath‘s obligation to independently consider the
meaning of the Constitution and its obligations is truly indefeasible. Even
the people the President serves cannot lift the burden from his shoulders.
Apart from these informational influences on a President‘s assessment
of his oath, a host of practical constraints may influence how a President
proceeds. Outgoing and incoming administrations, each of them focused on
establishing or maintaining a legacy, may clash over various administrative
and policy matters.42 Significant disagreement on constitutional questions
might exacerbate those tensions, especially when the administrations are of
two different parties. In rare cases—including, perhaps, the current transition—further tensions may arise if members of the incoming president‘s
party or staff believe the outgoing administration should be investigated for
possible wrongdoing.43 The potential wrangling in such cases may include
whether the outgoing administration ought to issue pardons to its own staff,
and whether the incoming administration should devote its resources to correcting past wrongs. All of this may convince the incoming administration
that it is best to focus on its own agenda rather than incur the costs of correcting past constitutional errors. Moreover, every incoming president must
also think strategically about how his own actions will be treated by his
successor.
Finally, consider the simple fact of limited resources. As Professor
Prakash writes, ―[i]f the President had infinite resources, both mental and
monetary, satisfaction of his oath might require nothing less than his unremitting attention coupled with perfection.‖44 In fact, the new President has
the question of whether they ought to defer to the statutory and constitutional judgments of their predecessors.‖). For an instructive discussion of precedent outside the Judicial Branch, see Michael J. Gerhardt, Non-Judicial Precedent, 61 VAND. L. REV. 713 (2008).
42
See generally Beermann & Marshall, supra note 29.
43
See Risen & Lichtblau, supra note 34.
44
Prakash, Duty to Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, supra note 32, at 1675.
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a host of policy and constitutional obligations, from faithfully executing existing law to pursuing a variety of domestic and foreign policy objectives.
These obligations make it difficult for the President to ―act as if his only objective was to assure that his administration never executed an unconstitutional statute.‖45
All this suggests that even a conscientious presidential oath-taker may
find it both unwise and difficult—if not impossible—to engage in a wholesale revisiting of the body of law he is charged with executing. Those who
have urged President-elect Obama to reverse every constitutional error allegedly made by President Bush may be making unreasonable demands, especially if they also believe that President Obama ought to be working
toward an agenda of his own.
As important as these practical constraints are, however, they do not
render the President‘s obligations under the oath any less indefeasible.
How the President balances his own vision of the Constitution with the host
of informational influences and practical constraints that hedge him in is up
to him. He will build his legacy from the moment he takes the oath, as he
considers how to meet his obligations to the Constitution while balancing
them with the practical needs of administration and the constitutional views
of others.46
IV. FOUR CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE NEW PRESIDENT
I have argued that the President faces an indefeasible personal obligation under the Presidential Oath Clause to decide what the Constitution
means, what powers it confers upon him, and what duties it involves. That
obligation may extend as far as literally opening the books on every law he
is required to execute, and reexamining and ratifying or rescinding every
action taken by the preceding administration. Given the welter of practical
constraints on the President that duty is likely to be imperfectly fulfilled,
but it is a duty nevertheless.
What does this suggest for the Obama administration itself? As President-elect Obama prepares to take the oath, what should he be thinking
about? Let me suggest four considerations, moving from the practical to
the abstract.
First, despite the President‘s general duty under the oath to preserve
the whole Constitution, the President-elect must pick his battles. The costs
of treating each presidential transition as a referendum on the entire corpus
of executive law are too great to allow the President to focus his ―unremitting attention‖ on these issues.47 That does not mean the President should
45

Id. at 1676.
See id. at 1677 (―There is a difference between making a decision about how best to allocate
scarce resources in a manner that satisfies multiple duties and choosing to turn a blind eye to the potential constitutional infirmities of a law.‖).
47
Id. at 1675.
46
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treat his administration as a tabula rasa. The oath to preserve the Constitution surely requires the President to take at least some actions with respect
to the prior administration—for example, to reconsider executive policies
on surveillance, on interrogation policies, and on the constitutional status of
Guantanamo Bay.48 However, the President cannot simultaneously attempt
to achieve his policy goals while also treating his administration as a
wholesale revisiting of the prior administration. To the extent that the President, in taking the oath, arrives at a different vision of what is constitutional or unconstitutional than the prior administration, he ought to focus on
reexamining the most important and continuing cases in which he believes
the constitutional oath requires him to chart a different course.
Second, the new President should keep in mind the virtues of transparency. It is no accident, after all, that most presidents have chosen to take
the oath in public. As we have seen, they understood that in doing so they
were tying their honor to the public fulfillment of their oath. A President
who sees his oath as demanding a different interpretation of the Constitution ought to make some effort to explain that vision to the people and to
the other constitutional actors—the courts, Congress, and state officials—
who also take oaths to the Constitution and may interpret the document differently. He should do so not only because honor and the oath demand it,
but also because those actors may have something useful to say about his
interpretation of the Constitution. Moreover, transparency in these circumstances, by signaling the President‘s seriousness and sincerity, may enhance
his effectiveness in office.49
Third, the new President should consider a range of other practical
measures he can take to demonstrate that he is a ―credible executive.‖ That
includes the use of independent commissions, the making of bipartisan appointments within the Executive Branch, the use of the media, and the use
of both informal and statutory ―precommitments‖ binding the President to
particular policies.50 By establishing the President‘s good faith and credibility, such measures may give him some breathing room as he attempts to fulfill his oath to independently understand and apply the Constitution.
Finally, and more abstractly, the President must decide. However
much President Bush may have been derided for calling himself the ―decider,‖ under the Presidential Oath Clause that is precisely what he is, at a fundamental level. The President, on taking the oath, must decide for himself
exactly what that oath entails: what the Constitution means in his own view,
what authority he has, what executive measures he may advance or must
48
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rescind, and what future obligations of legal enforcement or nonenforcement he has. The President may read the Constitution and the oath in the
light of history, including the weight of prior presidential practice and the
views of other constitutional actors; he may also consider the policy constraints that hem him in. But at the end of the day he must decide for himself where his obligations lie.
We may be reassured in all of this by the fact that President-elect Obama is a former constitutional law professor. But two things we know
about constitutional law professors should temper that optimism. Too many
of them focus, understandably but lamentably, on judicial interpretations of
the Constitution rather than on the constitutional text itself;51 under the oath,
the President must crack open the Constitution for himself rather than rely
on the Supreme Court‘s glosses on that document. Second and relatedly,
most constitutional law proceeds from the perspective of what the courts
have said and done. The ―‗interpretive stance‘ of someone swearing the
oath of office as President of the United States‖52 is different. It may be influenced by judicial, congressional, and presidential precedent, but it is ultimately singular and independent. Each new President, including this one,
will have to relearn and rethink the Constitution, both in the abstract and
from a peculiarly presidential perspective.
CONCLUSION
The devil is in the details, of course, and this Essay has left many details to be sorted out. Ultimately, the new President must decide for himself
what the oath means and what it requires of him; whether he is sworn to
preserve the Constitution or the nation itself; whether he must reexamine
his predecessors‘ actions or whether he may treat his oath-taking as Day
One; and how he balances his obligations under the oath with the host of informational influences and policy constraints that will confront him. The
Presidential Oath, like all constitutional oaths, ties his personal and professional honor to the Constitution, individually and indefeasibly. In making
these decisions, the President will be alone, confronted with all the questions of constitutional meaning and obligation that have been with us since
Philadelphia. He, and we, will face another in an unbroken line of constitutional moments.
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